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INTRODUCTION 
·M.y purpose in writing this thesis has been inspired 
largely by the desire for a more familiar aoquaintance with 
the practical aspeots of Aristotle's logical works. For 
many years I have had an intimate acquaintance and a great 
appreciation of Schopenhauer' s The Art ._.2!_ Cont!o.versy. The 
indication of these two facts to my advisor led to the 
suggestion of a comparative study of the two works. 
By the very nature of the case, we have confined our 
study of Aristotle to the Topics and De So£histicis.Elenchis. 
As far as we know there has bee nothing whatever written ~pon 
the subject of our thesis. Hence commentaries and secondary 
sources have been of no value, although I have consulted a 
nnmber of commentaries on Aristotle's logic. 
With a few exceptions which have been indicated, I 
have used Edward Poste's translation of De Sophistiois 
Elenohis. Other quoted references have been taken from the 
translation by Ross. Bailey's translation of Schopenaauer's 
The Art of C~~troversy has been used. 
THEIR PURPOSE COMPARED 
Schopenhauer's purpose in writing the Art~ Controversz 
is very briefly dealth with and is stated in an incidental 
manner. After defining Dialectic as a science mainly concern-
ed with tabulating and analyzing dishonest stratagems, he 
tells us that what follows in his book is to be regarded as a 
first attempt to develop a science of Dialectic. To t1se his 
own language_, "I am not aware that anything has been done in 
this direction, although I_have made inquiries far and wide. 
1. 
It is therefore, an uncultivated soil.n 
He tells us that his purpose of developing a system of 
Dialectio must be accomplished by drawing from experience; 
observation of debates arising from intercourse between men; 
and by noting the common elements and stratagems employed 
in the different forms of disputation. 
By observin~ these, he remarks that "we shall be en-
abled to exhibit certain general stratagems which may be 
advantageous as well for our own use as for frustrating 
2. 
others if they use them." 
This is Schopenhauer's statement of his purpose. It is 
merely "to find out the oommon elements and tricks" and 
"to exhibit certain general stratagems." His work consists 
in noting and illustrating thirty-eight such dialectical 
stratagems. We shall endeavor later to see how much of an 
"unoultivated soiln there was and to observe to what extent 
this soil had been onltivated in the writings of Aristotle. 
Aristotle's logical works, called the Organon, treat 
of a greatvariety of snbjects, tt•ering the whole field of 
logic. Since onr stndy will be based largely on the TO£iea 
and the Soph)~~cis __ Elenchis, we shall dednoe the pnrpose 
of his writing from these. In the opening paragraph of 
the Topic a, Aristotle states his purpose: "Our treatise 
proposes to find a line of inqniry whereby we shall be able 
to reason from opinions that are generally accepted abont 
every problem proponnded to ns, and also shall ourselves, 
when standing np to an argnment, avoid sayin& anything that 
will obstruct ns. First, then, we must say what reason~g 
is, and what its varieties are, in order to grasp dialectical 
reasoning; for this is the object of our search in the treatis 
3. 
before us." 
Obviously, a method of reasoning from premisses general-
ly accepted about every problem propounded is broader in 
scope than a mere statement of intellectnal frands. It will 
be noted here that Aristotle's purpose was a line of inquiry 
which would enable one to reason from opinions that are 
generally accepted. This reasoning from generally accepted 
opinions is what Aristotle calls "dialectical" reasoning, 
in contrast to demonstrative, contentious, or mis-reasoning. 
At the beginning of the SO£histi~is Elenehis, Aristotle 
also gives a statement of his purpose: "We propose to treat 
of sophistical confutation and those seeming confutations which 
are not really confutations, but paralogism: and we thus 
4. 
begin following the natural order of inquiry." His 
natural order of inquiry is as follows: classification of 
reasoning; the branches of sophistry; fallacies dependent 
on diction and those not dependent on diction. After treat-
ing of the above, he tells us of his further purpose: nwe 
have expounded the sources of questions and the mode of 
questioning in contentious disputation. We have now to 
discuss answers and solution and the use of this theory." 
What follows then is largely a discussion of the solution of 
the various fallacies. 
Again we can see that Aristotle's stated purpose was 
much broader than merel~ stating various dialectical strata-
gems. In the conclusion of his work on the fallacies, 
.Aristotle reviews his purpose. Here he tells us that his 
aim was the invention of a method of reasoning on any problem 
from the most probable premisses. He explains that that is 
the essential task of _Dialectic and pirastic. But because 
sophistry is near to it, a treatise was annexed to enable one 
to defend a thesis without self-contradiction. He further 
reviews the fact that in his work he has shown how to arrange 
questions and has suggested solutions of fallacies. Then he 
makes a statement that he has also dealt with "other matters 
pertaining to this system.n This, he tells us, was his 
"original design. n 
If we bear in mind that Schopenhauer's purpose was a 
mere statement of the various types of intellectual tricks 
without any reference to a particular form of classification 
and contrast this with the ambitious aims of Aristotle as 
stated above, we can easi~y understand that Aristotle's treat-
ment and purpose was far more extensive. This difference in 
their purpose accounts for the fact that much of Aristotle's 
treatment of the stratagems is incidents~. In fact, as we 
shall see· later, many of the stratagems found in Schopenhauer 
are stated in .Aristotle as solutions of the fallacy, rather 
than an explicit statement of the stratagems. It is wortny of 
note, however, that in the fifteenth chapter of the Sophistic.~ 
Elenchis, where Aristotle treats of arrangement and the tactics 
of the questioner, there is to be found an explicit statement 
of many of the common dialectical frauds. We shall see that 
Schopenhauer takes a number of his suggestions from this 
chapter. 
A COMPARISON 0~ THEIR DEFINITION ....Q.~ DIALEC~_IC 
In discussing the relation of,Schopenhauer's The Art of 
Controversy with Aristotle's Dialectic it seems advisable to 
consider their definition of the idea of dialectic. Schopen-
hauer explains that the ancients used logic and dialectic as 
synonymous terms, although Aorl/lrtf~,, "tofuink over, to 
consider, to calculate," and J:..a.A&ji!cr~""' , "to converse," 
1. 
are two very different things. 
.. 
Schopenhauer further notes that the name Dialectic was 
first used by Plato; and in the Phaedrus, ~ophist, Republic, 
Book VII, and elsewhere we find that by Dialectic he means 
the regular employment of the reason, and skill in the 
practice of it. Aristotle also use.s the word in this,; sense, 
but according to Laurentius Valla, he was the first to use 
Logic too in a similar way. Dialectic, therefore, seems to be 
an older word than Logic. Cicero and Quintillian used them 
2. 
with the same signification. 
The use of the words Dialectic and Logic as.synonyms 
lasted through the Middle Ages until recently. Kant in 
particular used Dialectic in a bad sense as meaning, "the art 
of sophistical controversy." Though the two terms originally 
meant the same and since Kant, have again been recognized as 
synonymous, Schopenhauer notes that Logic has been preferred 
3. 
as having the most innocent designation. 
He regrets that the ancient use of the word is such 
that he is not at liberty to distinguish their meaning. Other 
r" 
~----------------------------------------------------------~ 
wise, ~I should have preferred to define Logic (from Mr~:~s , 
"word" and "reason", which are inseparable) as "the science 
of the laws of thought, that is, of the method of reason"; 
and Dialectic {from JCtl.Air~d"'~..,' , "to converse" - and every 
conversation communicates either facts or opinions, that is 
to say, it is histo~ical or deliberative) as "the art of dis-
4. 
putation", in the modern sense of the word. 
After stating his own preference as to the meaning of 
the words Logic and Dialectic, Schopenhauer states that "logic 
deals with a subject of a purely a priori character, separable 
in definition from experience, namely the laws of thought, 
the process of reason, or the ~~cs; the laws, that is, which 
reason follows when it is left to itself and not hindered, as 
in the case of solitary thought on the part of a rational 
being who is in no w~y misled. Dialectic, on the other hand, ( 
would treat of the intercourse between two rational beings 
who, because they are rational, ought to think in common, but 
who, as soon as they cease to agree like two clocks keeping 
exactly the same time, create a disputation or intellectual 
contest. Regarded as purely rational beings the individuals 
would necessarily be in agreement and their variation spring 
from the difference essential to individuality; in other 
5. 
words, it is drawn from experience." 
For him, therefore, Logic as the science of the process 
of pure reason should be capable of being constructed a 
priori, while Dialectic for the most part, ean be constructed 
only a posteriori. We may learn its rule by experiential 
knowledge of the disturbance which r1ure thought suffers 
through the difference of individuality manifested in the 
intercourse between two rational beings. We may also learn 
rules of Dialectid by acquaintance with the means which dis-
nutants adopt in order to make good against one another their 
individual thought, and to show that it is pure and objective. 
Schopenhauer prefers to eall that branch of knowledge which 
treats of the natural obstinacy of human nature and its 
results in reasoning, Dialectic. But in order to avoid 
misunderstanding, he calls it controversial or eristical 
Dialectic. He observes that "eristic is only a harsher name 
6. 
for the same thing." 
Schopenhauer then defines controversial Dialectic as 
the art of disputing and in disputing in such a way as to 
hold one's own, whether one is in the right or in the wrong. 
He illustrates this by noting that na man may be objectively 
in the right and nevertheless, in the eyes of the bystanders, 
and sometimes in his own, he may come off worst." He gives 
the following example: "I may advance a proof of some 
assertion and my adversary may refute the proof, and thus 
appear to have refuted the assertion, for which there may, 
nevertheless be other proofs. In this case, of course, my 
adversary and I change places. He comes off best, although 
7. 
as a matter of fact, he is in the wrong." 
Schopenhauer attributes this to the natural basis of 
, ' 
r s. 
human nature. "Our innate vanity •••• will not suffer us to 
allow that our first position was wrong and our adversary's 
ripht •••• With most men innate vanity is accompanied by loqua-
city and innate dishonesty. They speak before they think, 
and even though they may afterwards perceive that they are 
wrong, and that what they assert is false, they want to seem 
to the contrary. The interest of truth •••• now gives way to 
the interests of vanity: and so, for the sake of vanity, what 
8. 
is true must seem false· and what is false must seem true. n 
Because of the weakness of our intellect and the perYe~eity 
of our will disputants fight not for truth, but for proposi-
tions. 
Every man to some extent is armed against int.elleetual 
frauds by his own cunning and villainy. He learns this by 
daily experience and by this comes to have his own natural 
Dialectic, just as he has his own natural Logic. But his 
Tiialeetic is by no means as safe a guide as his Logic. Though 
false judgments are frequent, false conclusions are rare. It 
is not so easy for one to think or draw inferences contrary 
to the laws of Logic. A man cannot easily be deficient in 
natural Logic, though he may very easily be deficient in 
natural Dialectic. Natu.ral Dialectic resembles the faculty 
of judgment, which differs in degree with every man, while 
reason, is the same. Thus it happens that in a matter in 
which a man is really in the right, he is confounded or refute~ 
by merely superficial arguments. If he does emerge victor-
rr-·----------------------------------------------------------~-·~ 
iously from a contest it is often owing not so much to the 
• 
correctness of his judgment in stating his proposition, as to 
the ability with which he defended it. Schopenhauer says, 
"Logic is concerned with the mere rorm of propositions; 
Dialectic with their contents or matter - in a word, with 
their substance." Again he says, "To form a clear idea of 
the province of Dialectic, we must pay no attention to object-
ive truth, which is an affair of Logic; we must regard it 
simply as the art of getting the best of it in a dispute •••• 
In itself Dialectic has nothing to do but to show how a man 
may defend himself against attacks of every kind, and espec-
ially against dishonest attacks; and in the same fashion how 
he may attack another man's statement without contradicting 
himself, or generally without being defeated. The discovery 
of objective truth must be separated from the art of winning 
acceptance for propositions; for objective truth is an 
entirely different matter: it is the business of sound 
judgment, reflection and experience, for which there is no 
9. 
special art." 
Schopenhauer objects to the definition of Dialectic as 
"the logic of appearance". He says in that case it would 
only be used to repel false propositions and even when a man 
has the right on his side, he needs Dialectic to defend and 
maintain it; he must know the dishonest tricks in order to 
meet them. Schopenhauer even adds, "He m~st often make use 
of them himself, so as to beat the enemy with his own weapons.• 
.I.Vo r----------------~ 
<( He suggests. further that "in a ditt.lectiaal contest we must put 
objective truth aside, or rather we must regard it as an 
accidental circumstance, and look only to the defense of our 
own position and the refutation of our opponent." And again, 
"No respect should be paid to objective truth, because we 
10. 
usually do not know where the truth lies.n 
He further elucidates his notion of Dialectic by stating 
"Dialectic then need have nothing to do with truth as little 
as the fencing master considers who is in the right when a 
dispute leads to a dllel. Thrust and parr~r is the whole 
business. Dialectic is the art of intellectual fencying; and 
it is only when we so regard it that we can erect in it a 
branch of knowledge. For if we take purely objeotive truth 
as our aim we are reduced to mere Logic; if we take the 
maintainence of false propositions it is mere Sophistic; and 
in either case it would have to be assumed that we were aware 
of what was true and what was false; and it is seldom that 
we have any clear idea of the truth beforehand. The true 
conception Qf Dialectic, is then, that which we have formed; 
it is the art of intellectual fencing used for the purpose 
of getting the best of it in a dispute; and although the 
name Eristic would be more suitable, it is more oorreot to 
11. 
call controversial Dialectic." 
The above is Schopenhauer' s definition of Dialectic. 
We now turn our attention to the consideration of the manner 
in which it was used by Aristotle. Apparently, Aristotle used 
lin 
the term .. Dialeotic in a broad sense. It seems that he uses 
it in one place in the sense of meaning merely the employment 
of reason, or, as the equivalent of Schopenhau.er's definition 
of logic. In another place he appears to u.se it in the sense 
of winning approval or assent from others • 
.At the beginning of the Topics Aristotle remarks, 
"First then, we mu.st say what reasoning is, and what its 
varieties are, in order to grasp dialectical reasoning: for 
this is the object of our search in the treatise before us." 
He then states the varieties of reasoning as being four in 
12 
nu.mber: (1) demonstrative reasoning, {2} dialectical 
reasoning, (3) contentious reasoning, and (4) mis-reasonings. 
He distingu.ishes them as follows: (1) "It is a demonstration 
when the premisses from which the reasoning starts are true 
and primary." {2) Dialectical reasoning is reasoning from 
opinions that are generally accepted. He defines "generally 
accepted" as things which are accepted by every one, or by 
the majority, or by the philosophers. (3) Contentious reason-
ing consists in starting from opinions that seem to be 
generally accepted, bu.t that are not actually so; or again, 
it is contentious reasoning if it merely seems to reason 
from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. 
(4) Aristotle observes that in·addition to demonstration, 
dialectical and contentic;us reasoning, there are mis-reason-
ings that start from premisses pecu.liar to the special 
sciences. 
....... 
These, Aristotle says, may stand for and outline survey 
of the species of reasoning~ He observes, however, that 
"the amount of distinction between them may serve, because 
it is not our purpose to give the exact definition of any 
of them; we merely want to describe them in outline; we 
consider it quite enough from the Doint of view of the line 
of inquiry before us to be able to recognize each of them 
13. 
in some sort of way." 
It will be noticed that Aristotle here defines 
Diale~tic as reasoning from opinions that are generally 
accepted. This obviously is not the meaning Schopenhauer 
attahced to his use of the word. .Aristotle's demonstrative 
reasoning seems to be comparable to what Schopenahauer pre-
fers to call "logic", which has to do with the form of the 
_proposition. The contentious reasoning of Aristotle 
corresponds to Schopenhauer's term, Dialectic. 
In Chapter II of the To£ica, Aristotle apparently used 
Dialectic in the sense of discovering truth. "For Dialectic 
is a process of criticism wherein iliies the path to the 
principles of all inquiries." It is to this use of the 
term Dialectic, that Schopenhauer would differ. For him, 
Dialectic never aids in the discovery of truth, for jrruth 
cannot be attained with certainty before the discussion 
begins. 
In Book I, Chapter XII of the To~Ac~, Aristotle 
distinguishes "how many species there are of' dialectical 
J.t:::. 
argtt.ments.~ These he states as being Induction on the one 
hand, and Reasoning, on the other. "Induction is a passage 
from individuals to universals." It is more convincing and 
clear and more readily learned by the use of the senses. 
Hence it is more applicable to the mass of men. He says, 
however, that Reasoning is more forcible and effective 
against contradictious people. Here again, Aristotle uses 
Dialectic in the sense of Schopenhauer's "logic". 
Instating the useful elements of Dialectic, Aristotle 
enumerates three: "intellectual training, casual encounters, 
and the philosophical sciences." He explains that for 
purposes of casual encounter, it is useful because when we 
have counted up the opinions held by most people, we shall 
meet them on the ground, not of other peoples' convictions, 
14. 
but of their own. In this instance, .Aristotle is using 
Dialectic in the sense of gaining acceptance for one's 
proposition. 
In the Sophist~is Elenchis .Aristotle distinguishes 
in great detail, Dialectic, from Sophistic, Eristic, ahd 
Pirastic proof. He tells us that npiJi.'astic is a species 
of Dialectic, and probes not knowledge but, ignorance and 
15. 
false pretension of knowledge." He then gives us a 
distinction between a dialectician and a sophist. He is a 
dialectician "who regards the common principles with their 
application to the particular matter 1n hand, whime he who 
16. 
only appears to do this is a sophist." The sophist 
el 
.L':te 
. ..------, --------, 
elsewhere .is distingtlished by his motive, "for the art of 
r ~ 
sophistry, as we have said, is a kind of art of money-making 
17. 
from a merely apparent wisdom." Eristic differs from 
So phi sti.c in the sense that the sophists seek financial 
reward. They, both, however, employ the same contentiotls 
reasoning, but the master of Eristic aims only at apparent 
18 
victory, While the sophist aims at the appearance of wisdom. 
The important thing to note here is that Aristotle dis-
tinguishes the dialectician from the sophist ~on the basis 
that the conclusions of the dialecticians are true in their 
form, while those of the sophist only "IYJear"to be so. This 
11se of Dialectic by .Aristotle is quite different from 
Schopenhauer's use of it. 
Schopenhauer deals with Aristotle's use of Dialectic 
and he states explicitly "Aristotle does not define the 
object of Dialectic exactly as I have done." He observes 
that Aristotle fails "to dr~w a sufficiently sharp distinc-
tion" between Dialectic as dealing with propositions accord-
ing to their truth or merely regarding them according to 
their plausibility. "The rules which he often ~ives for 
Dialectic contain some of those which properly belong to 
Logic." Again he says, "I am of the opinion, therefore, 
that a sharper distinction shotlld be drawn between Dialectic 
and Logic than Aristotle has given us; that to Logic we should 
assign objective trtlth as far as it is merely formal, and 
that Dialectic should be confined to the art of gaining one's 
lr'------------------------------------------------------------~~v• 
t: 
\ point, and contrarily that sophistic and eristic should not 
be distinguished from Dialectic in Aristotle's fashion, since 
the difference which he draws rests on objective and material 
truth; and in regard to what this is we cannot attain any 
19. 
clear certainty before discussion." 
It may help to clarify the matter presented if we give 
a brief suron1ary of our findings. 'We have seen that Schopen-
hauer makes a sharp distinction between Logic and Dialectic. 
Logic, for him, deals with the laws of thought; it is the 
nrocess of reasoning; it is concerned with the form of the 
proposition add objective truth. Dialectic, on the other 
hand, is the art of winning acceptance for one's views; it 
; is intellectua~ fencing, experimentally learned and deals 
not with the form of a proposition but with the matter or 
substance of the proposition. Schopenhauer notes that the 
word "eristic" is the same as his use of Dialectic, being 
only a harsher term. He does not prefer to call it 
sophistic since that consists in the maintenance of false 
propositions and is not acceptable because we can't be 
aware of what is or false. 
Aristotle uses the term Dialectic in a much broader 
sense than merely the art of winning acceptance for a thesis. 
He defines it in one place as reasoning from opinions that 
are generally accepted. He suggests, however, that this 
definition was not expected to be exact, but merely sufficient 
for his present purpose. El.sewhere, Aristotle suggests that 
;;,. 1---------------------------------------------' 1\ ~ 
...... 
Induct~on .~nd Reasoning are sp~cies of Dialectic. Again, he 
indicates that Dialeatic is useful for t~e purpose of the 
philosophiaal sciences. Here he is using it as equivalent 
to Schopenhauer's use of Logic. Inaddition to the above use 
of Dialectic by Aristotle, he seems to use it in the sense 
of merely gaining plausible approval. In other words, for 
Aristotle the word is used in a broad sense wh~ch would cover 
the meaning of what Schopenhauer called Logic and also 
Dialectic. 
~m~ASIS OF ~IALE~TIC 
Schopenhauer says that in finding the basis of all 
Dialectic we must consider the essential nature of every 
dispute. This he endeavors to do by dividing the modes of 
refutation into two parts. There are two courses that may 
be ~ursued. (1) The modes are (1) ad rem, (2) ad hominem 
...... 
or ex concessis. That is to say: we may show either that the 
proposition is not in accordance ·with the nature o{ things, 
i.e., with absolute objective truth; or that it is inco~-
sistent with other statements or admissions of our opponent, 
that is, with truth as it appears to him. The latter mode 
of arguing a ~uestion·produces only relative conviction, and 
makes no difference whatever to the objective truth of the 
matter. 
(2) The two courses that we may pursue are {1) the direct, 
and (2) the indirect. The direct attacks the reason for 
the thesis; the indirect, the results. The direct ref~tation 
r 
shows that the thesis is not true; the indirect, that ~rt 
cannot be true. 
A two-fold procedure is· possible in pursuing the 
direct course. We may either show that the reasons for the 
statement are false (~~o- f!1B..J_orem 2_.,.!E_inor~); or we may .admit, 
the reasons i'Jr premisses, but show that the. statement does 
not follow from them ( nego conse~uenti~~); that is, we 
attack the conclusion or the form of the syllogism. 
The direct refutation makes use either of the diversion 
0~ .of the. instance. (1) The diversion. - We accept our 
ounonent's nrouosition as true, and then show what follows 
~~ . . ~ .. 
from it when we bring it into connection with some other 
proposition acknowledged to be true. We use the two proposi-
tions as the premisses of a syllogism giving a conclusion whic 
is manifestly false, as contradicting either the nature of 
things, or other statements of our opponent himself; that is, 
the conclusion is false either ad rem or ad hominem. Conse-
~uently, our opponent's ~reposition must have been false; for, 
while true premisses can give only a true conclusion, false 
rremisses need not always give a false one. 
(2) The instance. - or the example of the contrary. This 
consists in refuting the general proposition by direct 
reference to particular cases which are included in it in the 
way in which it is stated, but to which it does not a~ply, 
1. 
and by which it is therefore shown to be necessarily false. 
The above is Schopenhauer's framework or skeleton of 
all the forms of disputation. He says that "to this every 
kind of controversy may be ultimately reduced." He allows, 
however, that the whole of the controversy may proceed in the 
manner described or only appear to do so. In other words, 
it may be supported by genuine or srurious arguments. 
Aristotle states substantially the same thing as above 
when he enumerates the ways of preventing proof. "There are 
four possible ways of preventing a man from ~orking his 
argument to a conclusion. It can be done either by demolish 
the point on which the falsehood that comes ab~ut.depends, 
or by stating an objection directed against the questioner; 
for often when a solution has not as a matter of fact been 
brou~ht, yet the questioner is rendered thereby unable to 
pursue the argument any farther. Thirdly, one may object 
to the uquestions asked for it may happen that what the 
questioner wants does not follow from the ~uestions he has 
asked because he has asked them badly, whereas if something 
additional be granted, the conclusion comes about. If, 
then the questioner be unable to pursue his argument farther, 
the objection would ~roperly be directed against the 
questioner; if he can do so, then it would be aginst his 
nuestions. The fourth and worst kind of objection is that 
which is directed to the time allowed for disaussion: for 
some people bring objections of a kind which would take 
longer to answer than the length of the discussicn in hand. 
"There are then, as we have said, four ways of making 
objections: but of them, the ~irst alone is a solution: 
the others are just hindrances and stumblinb blocks to 
• 2. 
prevent the conclusions." 
We may note that the purpose of Aristotle here is not 
perfectly parallel with Schopenhauer's discussion of the 
essential nature of every dispute. There is, however, the 
fact that Aristotle suggests in this ~lace that one of the 
modes of refuting an argument is to show that the proposi-
tion is not in accordance with the nature of things, or in 
other words, attaokihg the premise, "BY demolishing the point 
on which the falsehood that comes about depends." Paste 
translates this phrase, "The repudiation of A false premise. 
This we say, is a parallel to what Schopenhauer calls "the 
direct refutation (which) shows that the thesis is not true." 
' Notice that .Aristotle himself observes "there are then, 
as we have said, four ways of making objection: but of them 
the first alone is a solution: the others are just hindrances 
and stumbling blocks to prevent the conclusion. rr These 
stumbling blocks and hindrances might roughly correspond 
to Sohopenhauer's indireot method of refutation. 
~rn the Sophi~t.i2_is El,!3_~his Aristotle also gives us 
the method of disputation. "As solution is either addressed 
to the proof, or the prover and his questions, or to neither; 
so questions and proof may be addressed either to the thesis, 
. 
the answerer, or the time, when the solution requires more 
time than is allowed, or the ~uestioner has time for a 
3. 
re ,ioinder." 
Here again we find latent in Aristotle that which 
Schopenhauer has elaborated as the basis of Dialectic. Vlhen 
Aristotle speaks of a solution as being "addressed to the 
~roof", this is what Schopenhauer calls the direct mode of 
refutation. Likewise when Aristotle speaks of addressing 
the solution "to the prover" he approximates Schopenhauer's 
indirect mode of refutation. 
Elsewhere in the So£histi~i Elenchi Aristotle gives 
L------------------' 
u.s in .subs,t 8noe wh,at SohopenhaueD laid dovm as the basis of 
Dialeotic. He is enumerating the objeots aimed at when dis-
. 
putants are "contentious and fight for victory." He lays down 
five objects: "to confute the oppon~nt, to drive him into 
naradox, to reduce him to solecism, and to reduce him to pleo-
.. 
nasm, that is, to superfluous repetition: or the semblance of 
4. 
any one of these achievements without the reality." 
Aristotle then adds, "The end most desired is to confute the 
answerer, the next to Phow that he holds a false opinion, the 
third to lead him into paradox, the fourth to land him into 
solecism, that is, to show that his expression involves a 
violation of the laws of grammar, the fifth to foroe him to 
5. 
unmeaning repetition." 
Again we note that Aristotle proposes the direct method 
of refutation: "Show that he holds false opinion"; and the 
indireot: "To lead him to paradox." Later Aristotle devotes 
~uite a long chapter to.the methods of refutation by bringing 
one into paradox. One of the suggested methods is an 
exoellent example of what Schopenhauer calls the diversion, 
which he explains as accepting our opponent's proposition as 
true and then show what followsfrom it when we bring it with 
connection with some other propasition acknowledged to be 
true. Aristotle states this paradox as follows: "Paradox 
may be elicited by considering to what school the respondent 
belongs, snd proposing some tenet of' the school that the 
world pronounces to be a paradox; for there are such tenets 
in every sahool. For this puxpose it is ~aeful to hsve made 
a oolleation of paradoxes. The proper solution is to show 
that the paradox has no eonneation with the thesis, as the 
6. 
disputant pretends. n 
We may aonclude by calling attention to the fact that 
though Saho~enhauer does not follow Aristotle in so many 
words when he gives his basis of Dialectic, yet as we have 
endeavored to show, Aristotle has in substance what Schopen-
hauer sets forth in a very lucia manner, that the essential 
nature of every dispute may be reduced to two modes of 
refutation, that is, by showing that the proposition is not 
according to the nature of things, or that it is inconsist-
ent with other statements or admissions of our opponent. 
The following schema may help to clarify the matter: 
Schopenhauer, we may note, proposes a framework or skeleton 
of all forms of disputation to which every kind of contro-
versy may ultimately be reduced. This, he aalls, "The 
essential ,nature of every dispute" or "the basis of all 
dialectic." 
Sohopenhauer says that there are two modes of 
refuting a thesis and two courses that may be pursued. 
I Two Modes 
II Two Couxses 
1. ad~ (proposition not objectively true 
2. ad hominem (inconsistent with admiss-
ions of opponent). 
1. diversion 
direct 
2. instance 
indirect t------------------~~~--------------------~ 
Two-fold procedure of the direct course: 
ad rem 
1. Diversion 
ad hominem 
2. Instance (refuting a universal by citing a 
particular example) 
Aristotle has no su•h framework. He does not ex-
23. 
plicitly deal with the basis of all Dialectic. Hence one is 
forced to find some basis of similarity in the incidental 
remarks of Aristotle. This we have endeavored to do, not 
by drawing an exact parallel, but by showing that Schopen-
hauer reduces the basis of Dialectic to two modes ot retu-
tation which are the direct or ad ~' and indirect or ad 
hominem; and that Aristotle does the same. He expresses 
the direct method as showing that the oppoent "holds a 
false opinion", and the indirect method by leading an 
o9ponent into what he calls "paradox." In other words, 
both Sahopenhauer and Aristotle agree that refutation con-
sists in showing that propositions are contrary to the 
nature of things or inconsistent with other statem~nts or 
admissions of one's opponent. 
l 
l------______. 
....... 
AN . .INTRODUCTIO:T.J~.Q .. THEIR DIALECTICAL STI:ATAGEMS 
The term DIALECTICAL STRATAGEMS is the term that Sohopen-
ha~er uses to describe the thirty-eight fraudulent tricks 
which can be_used to get the best of it in a dispute. 
Aristotle does not in so many words use the term DIALECTICAL 
STRATAGEHS, he does, however, speak of "eristic confutation," 
which is not ngenuine but only apparent". And again he speaks 
of enumerating "the sources of paralogism and frauds of, the 
questioner~" 
In order to form an adequate compar~son o~ what we 
shall call their Dialectical Stratagems it will be necessary 
to outline their procedure. Sohopenha~er, with the exception 
of two introductory chapters, devotes the entirety of his 
Trlli ART OF CONTROVERSY to a statement of the various strata-
gems. These are nrunbered from one to thirty-eight, and are 
apparently given in no specific seq~ence. 
Aristotle, on the contrary, has a very system~tic 
arrangement in his Sonhistic :Jlenchis. His opening_paragraph 
.tells ~s nwe propose to treat of sophistical confutations 
and those seeming confutations which are not really confuta-
1. 
tions, but paralogisms;" and we thus begin, following the 
2. 
natural order of inquiry." As we have already indicated, 
our attempted comparison of the Art~! Controversl with the 
Dialectic of Aristotle must of necessity make almost 
exclusive use of the ?2~~~ticis Elenchis, for it is here that 
~D. 
treats the logioal fallaoies. 
In this work Aristotle lived up to his purpose in follow-
"the natural order of inquiry." The wo~k may be divided in 
to four parts: (1) Introduction, oh. 1-2, (2) Perpetration 
of Fallacies, eh. 3-15, (3) Solution of Fallacies, ch. 16-32, 
(4) Epilogue, ch. 34. 
In the Introduction Aristotle expatiates on the distinc-
tion of genuine from merely apparent reasoning and confuta-
tion. "So proof and confutation are either real or only seem 
to be such to the inexperienced •••••• Proof is a tissue of 
propositions, so related that we of necessity assert some 
(; 
ftlrther pro,position as a conseqtlence. Confutation is a 
proof whose conclusion is the contradictory of a given 
3. 
thesis.", 
He tells us "it answers the purpose of some persons 
rather to seem to be philosophers and not to be, than to be 
and not to seem; for Sophistry is seeming but unreal philos-
ophy, and the sophist is a person who makes money by the 
semblance of philosophy without the reality; and for his 
success it is requisite to seem, to perform the f'unct ion of 
the philosopher without performing it, rather than to per-
4. 
form it without seeming to do so.• He says further 
that 
5. 
"those who wish to practice as Sophists will aim 
at the kind of reasonings we have described, for it 
suits their purpose, as the faculty of thus reasoning 
produces a semblance of philosophy, which is the end 
6. 
they propose." 
At the end of this ehapter he tells us what he expects 
to do in the following chapters of the book. "The various 
kinds of sophistical reasoning, the branches of a sophistical 
faculty, the various elements of the sophistical profession, 
7. 
and other components of the art remain to be examined." 
In the next cha:pter he distinquishes reasoning into four 
orders: Didactic, Dialectic, Paristic, and Eristic. After 
this he enumerates the five ob(jects aimed at VJhen disputants 
"are contentious and fight for victory." In the fourth 
chapter he observes that "seeming confutations fall Qnder 
two divisions: those where the semblance depends on language, 
and those where it is independent of language." Here he 
enumerates the fallacies dependent on diction, which are 
six in number. "The ambiguity of a term, ambiguity of a 
proposition, the possibility of wrong disjunction, the 
possibility of wrtong conjunction, the possibility of wrong 
8. 
accentuation, the similarity of termination." After 
illustration the use of these, he discusses the seven 
fallacies that are not dependent on diction. They arise 
from "the equation of subjects and accidents; from the 
confusion of an absolute statement with a statement limited 
in manner, place, time or relation; from an inadequate 
notion of confutation; from a conversion of consequent and 
<.;I e 
from begging the rJ.uestion; from taking what is 
for a aause; and lastly, from putting many questio 
After illustration the above by examples of each, 
observes "for all the fallacies we enumerated may be resolved 
into offenses against the definition of confutation; for 
either the reasonings are inconclusive; whereas the premisses 
ought to involve the conclusion, of n-eessity and not merely 
$'-' 
appearance, or they fail to· satisfy the remaining elements 
10. 
the definition." 
In the next chapter he notes that *11 the fallacies ar~se 
confusion and must be solved by drawing proper dist.inc-
"In all these the minuteness of the difference 
the deception, for it makes us fail to entirely 
11. 
the definition of proposition and proof.• From 
here he endeavors to draw the difference between paralogism 
~nd sophistic proof. Then follows a long discussion of the 
4isti~ction between Sophistic, and Eristic, Sophistic and 
Psuedographic, Scientific and Pirastic proof. Following 
this he tells us how to show the various fallacies, how 
into paradoxes, how to reduce to tautology or 
Then he discusses the different methods of 
an argument so as to conceal on:e! s }1Urpose. It 
is in this chapter that we will find many parallels in 
hopenhauer. 
In the third section &~ the treatise he discusses the 
lutions to various fallacies. He ditides them into those 
dependent .on diation, which are ·all)bigU:ity and amphiboly; 
ambiguous division and aombination of words; wrong aoaent; 
like expressions for different things. The other division, 
those not depending on diction, are aoaident; use of words 
with or without qualifiaation; ignoratio enelahi; petitio 
principii; the eonse1uent; false cause; many questions. 
Thus we have tried to state briefly a comparison of 
Sohopenhauer's and Aristotle's plan of procedure as a 
background for a more detailed comparison of their Dialectical 
stratagems. 
I 
The first dialectical stratagem ot Sahopenhauer is the 
extension or exag@eration ot a proposition beyond its natural 
limits. 
•This consists in carrying your opponent's 
proposition beyond its natural limits; in giving 
it as general a signification and as wide a sense as 
possible, so as to exaggerate it; and, on the other 
hand, in giving your own proposition as restricted 
a sense and as narrow limits as you can because 
the more general a statement beeomes, the more 
numerous are the obJections to which it is open. 
The defence consists in an accurate statement of the 
point or essential question at issue." 1. 
The statement of this stratagem is not explicitly found 
., : ,..., .. L 
. ' I 
in Aristotle. He does, however, suggest that "~ometimes the 
~uestioner must attack a propositlon different from the thesis 
2 
~Y means of misinterpretation if he cannot attack the th~sts." 
He also warns us that "fallacies that omit some element in 
the definition ••.• must be solved by examining whethe.r. :1;he 
conclusion is contradictory to the thesis, and regards the 
same terms in the same portion, in the same relation, in the 
3. 
same mam1er, and in the same time." 
II 
Sohopenhauer's second stratagem is to extend a proposi-
r tion beyond its natural meaning and then refute the extended 
' 
I t; proposition. It is a soDhism based on homonymy. 
f· 
t "This trick is to extend a proposition to ~----s-om_e_t_h_i_n_g_w_h_i_c_h_h_a_s~l!!!".'i"!!'t_t_l_e_o_r_n_o_t_h_i_n_g_i_n_o_o_mm_o_n ______ ~ 
with the matter in question but the similarity of 
the word·s; then to re:t'llte it trillmphantly, and so 
claim oredit for having refllted the original state-
ment •••• This triok may be regarded as identical 
with the sophism ex homo~ia; it is a confusion of 
essentially differen~things-through the homonymy 
in a word and hence is an alteration of the point in 
dispute." 4. 
Aristotle, in Chapter XIX deals with the fallacies 
based on homonymia and amphibolia, Here he observes that 
"when there is an ambiguity in a term or prorosition of 
a confutation, the ambiguity sometimes lies in the premisses, 
sometimes in the conclusion ••• When the ambigllity lies in 
the conclusion, llnless the conalllsion is ;)re1;iously denied 
by the respondent, there is no confutation •••. for confutation 
5 •. 
requires contradiction." He suggests .that "the thesis 
should at starting, be stated with a 41atinction, if it conta 
any ambiguity." He speaks of the ambiguous proposition as 
being "true in the answerer~s sense, false in the opponent's." 
He further notes that "there is a distinction ·between a 
restricted and unrestricted premiss. If a questi?ner argues 
with regard to the distinction, we must contend that he 
has contradicted the name, not the reality, and therefore 
6. 
has not confuted." 
III 
Sohopenhauer's third trick is very similar to the 
first two, and the above references to Aristotle apply to 
it. 
~Another triak is to take a proposition which 
is laid down relatively, and inref'erenoe to some 
particular matter, as though it were uttered with a 
general or absolute application; or, at least to 
take it in some quite different· sense, and then 
refute it." 'l. 
As Sohopenhauer notes, Aristotle suggests an example 
of this trick which is as follows: "A Moor is blaok; but 
in regard to his teeth he is white; therefore, he is black 
8. 
and not black at the same moment." 
IV 
This stratagem of Schopenhauer is to refuse to admit 
true premisses because of a foreseen conclusion. 
"If you want to draw a conclusion, you must not 
let it be foreseen, but you must get the premisses admitte 
one by one, unobserved, mingling them here and there in 
your talk; otherwise, your opponent will attempt all 
sorts of chieanery. Or, if it is clollbtful whether 
your opponent will admit them, you must advance the 
premisses of these premisses; that is to say, you 
must dfaw up pro-syllogisms, and get theu premisses 
of several of them admitted in no definite order. 
In this you conceal your game until you have ob-
tained all the admissions that are necessary, and 
so reach your goal by making a circuit. These 
rules are gi.ven by Aristotle in his Tt,P.ica 8:1 • 
. It is a trick which needs no ill1:1stra fori':-" 9. 
It will be noted that Schopenhauer points out that the 
rules of these tricks are to be found in the Topics 8:1. In 
this chapter, Aristotle suggests that the use of premisses 
"to conceal the conclusion serve a controversial purpose only; 
but inasmuch as an undertaking of this sort is always conduct· 
ed against another peason, we are obliged to employ them as 
10. 
well." 
Aristotle further tells us that "concealment of ane's 
plan is obtaihed by securing through pro-syllogisms the 
nremisses through which the proof of the original proposition 
. -
is to be constructed and as many of them as possible. 
This is likely to be effected by making syllogisms to prove 
not only the necessary premisses, but also some of those 
11. 
which are required to establish them." 
v 
In number five Schopenhauer· suggests the use of the 
argument ex concessis. 
"To prove the truth of a proposition, you 
may also employ previous propositions that a~e 
not true, should your opponent refuse to admit 
the true ones, either because he fails to per-
ceive their truth, or because he sees that the 
thesis immediately follows from them. In that 
case the plan is to take propositions which 
are false in· themselves but true for your 
opponent, and argue from the way in which he 
thinks, that is to say, ex concessis. For a 
true conclusion may follow from false premiss-
es, but not vice versa. In the same fashion 
your opponent's false propositions, which, 
however, takes to be true; for it is with 
him that you have to do, and you must use 
the th~ughts that he uses. For instance, if -
he is a member of some sect to which you do 
not belong, you may employ the declared 
opinions of this sect against him, as 
principles." 12. 
Aristotle approaches this trick in his discussion of 
paradox. "Paradox may be elicited by considering to what 
school tae respondent belongs, and »roposing some tenets of 
the school that the world pronounces to be a paradox." 
VI 
In this Sahopenhauer uses the plan of begging the 
question. 
"Another plan is to beg the question in 
disguise by postulation vvhet has to be proved, 
either (1) under another name; for instance, 
ngood repute" instead of "honor"; ''virtue" 
instead of "virginity", eta; or by using such 
convertible terms as "red-llooded animals't 
end "vertebrates"; or (2) by making a 
general assumption covering the particular 
point in dsipute; for instance, maintain-
ing the uncertainty of medicine by postula-
tion of the uncertainty of all human know-
ledge. (3) If, vice versa, two things 
follow one from the other, and one is to 
be proved, you may postulate the other. 
!4) If a general proposition is to be 
proved, you may get your opponent to ad-
mit every one of the particulars. This 
is the converse of the second." 14. 
13. 
Aristotle suggests five weys in which people appear to 
beg the original question. 
FThe first and most obvious being if 
amy one begs the actual point, reQuiring to be 
shown: this is easily detected when put in 
so many words; but it is more apt to escape 
detection in the case of different terms, 
or a term and an expression that mean the 
same thing. A second way occurs whenever 
any one begs universally something which 
he has to demonstrate in a particular case: 
suppose (e.g.) he were trying to prove that 
the knowledge of contraries is one and were 
to claim that the knowledge of opposites 
in general is one: for then he is generally 
thought to be begcing, along with a number 
of other things, that which he ought to have 
shown by itself. A third way is, if any one 
wer~ t6 beg in particular oases what he 
und~rtakes to show universally: e.g. if he 
oc. 
undertook to show that the knowledge of con-
. traries is always one, and begged it of 
certain pai~s of contraries: for he also 
is generally considered to be begging in-
dependently and by itself, what, together 
with a number of other things, he ought 
to have shown. Again, a man begs the 
question if he begs his conclusion piece-
meal; supposing e.g. that he had to show 
that medicine is a science of what leads to 
health and to disease, and were to claim 
first the one, then the other; or, fifthly, 
if he were to beg the one or the other of 
a pair of statements that necessarily in-
volve one another; e.g. if he had to show 
that the diagonal is incommensurable with 
the side, and were to beg that the side is 
incommensurable with the diagonal." 15. 
In chapter 27 of the Sophi~tici __ Ele~~-~' Aristotle dis-
cusses the solution of the fallacy of begging the question. 
In this place he suggests the following: "In fallacies from 
begging and assuming the point in issue, if we are aware in 
time we should deny the proposition, even though it be 
probable, and say, as we fairly may, that it cannot be granted 
but must be proved." 
VII 
This stratagem is the use of the erotematic or socratic 
method of asking many questions and then concealing the 
intended conclusion. 
nsao~ld the disputation be conducted on 
somewhat striot and formal lines, and there be 
a desire to arrive at a very clear understand-
ing, he who states the proposition and wants 
to prove it may proceed against his opponent 
by question, in order to show the truth of the 
statement his admissions. This erotematic, 
or Socratic method was especially in use among 
V'Z o 
! ~----------------------------------------~----------------~ L 
c [, 
the ancients; and this and some of the following 
are akin to it. The plan is to ask a great many 
widereaching questions at once, so as to hide what 
you want to get admitted, and on the.other hand, 
quickly nropound the argument result~ng from the 
admissions· for those who are slow of understand-
ing cannot'follow accurately, and do not notice 
any.mistakes or gaps there may be in the demon-
stration." 16. 
Aristotle treats of the rules for concealment in the 
Topics, Book 8, Chapter 1, to which we have already referred. 
In the De Sonhistiois Elenohis he tells us that "for a con-
_......;;...;._ -
oealment of his purpose arrangement is important to the 
sophist as to the dialectician." He observes that "length 
is favorable to concealment; for it is hard to see the 
mutual relations of a long series of propositions •••• ~uick­
ness facilitates concealment for the answerer has not time 
17. 
to forsee consequences." 
VIII 
Here Schopenhauer suggests using the trick of making 
the ODponent angry. 
"This trick consists in making your 
opponent angry; for when he is angry he is 
incapable of judging aright, and perceiving 
where his advantage lies. You can make him 
angry by doing him repeated injustice, or 
practising some kind of chicanery, and being 
generally insolent.n 18. 
Aristotle has a very similar suggestion which he states 
as follows: 
[ "So too, anger and the heat of dispute 
1: for any mental discomfiture, puts us off guard. 
~ Anger may be produced by effrontery and open 
l----a-t_t_e_m_p_t_s_t_o_c_h_e_a_t_._·"-_1_9_·----------------...J 
IX 
In number nine, Schopenhauer suggests transposing 
q_uestions in order to maac procedure~ 
"Or you may _put q_u .. e st ions in an order 
different from that which the conclusion to 
be drawn from them requires, and transpose them, 
so as not to let hi!" know at what you are aiming. 
He can then take no precautions. You may also 
use his answers for different or even opposite 
conclusions, according to their character. 
This is akin to the trick of masking your 
procedure. n 20. 
Aristotle suggests the use of the trick of 'masking the 
procedure in a number of ~laces. In To~ics, Chapter !, Book I, 
he snggests the following method: "Moreover do not state the 
conclusions of these premisses, but draw them later one after 
another; for this is likel,y to keep the answerer at the great-
est possible distance from the original proposition. SpeAk-
in:;: generally, g man who desires to g-et information by a 
concealed method should so put his question thBt when he has 
put his whole argument and has stated the eonclllsion, people 
still ask, 'Well, but why is that?' "/ 
In the Sonhistic , Elenchi .Aristotle deals with the 
problem of masking procedure in his discussion of how to 
reduce the questioner to fa.lse or paradoxical statement. He 
says that false or paradoxical ·statement is obtained by 
qllestioning withollt previolls definition of the problem. He 
says, "Random answers are more likely to be wrong and answers 
are made at random when there is no point at issue •••• It is 
useful to multiply ~uestions •••• to lead him on to controversial 
vv• 
21. 
X 
This stratagem consists of asking the converse of what 
actually wants to have admitted. 
nrf you observe that your O,Pponent designedly 
returns a negative answer to the questions which, 
for the sake of your ,Proposition, you want him to 
answer in the affirmative, you must ask the 
converse of the proposition, as though it were 
that which you were anxious to see affiri;;ed; or, 
at any rate, you may give him his choice of both, 
so that he may not perceive which of them you 
are asking him to affirm." 22. 
Aristotle has a very parallel suggestion and states it 
in the following manner: 
"If one desires to secure an admission that 
the knowledge of contraries was one, one should 
ask him to admit it not of contraries but of 
opposites: for if he grants this, one will then 
argue that the knowledge of contraries is also 
the same, seeing that contraries are opposites. 
If he does not, one should secure the admission 
by induction, by formulating a proposition to 
that effect in the case of some particular 
pair of contraries. For one must secure nec-
essary premisses either by reasoning or by 
induction, or else partly by one and partly 
by another. 11 23. 
XI 
Schopenhall.er here sugBests the assumption of general 
truths from the admission of particular cases. 
"If you make an indll.ction, and yoll.r opponent 
grants you the .Particular cases by which it is to 
be supported, you must refrain from asking him if 
he also admits the general trll.th which issues from 
the particll.lars, but introde it afterwards as a 
settled fact; for, in the meanwhile, he will him-
self come to believe that he has admitted it, and 
the same impression will be received by the aud-
ience, because they will remember the many 
questions as to the particulars, and suppose that 
l)'l. 
24. 
they must, of course, have attained their end." 
We find the suggestion of this same stratagem in 
Aristotle. He says, "Often when the particulars of an 
induction are granted the universal should not be asked but 
employed as if granted, for the answerer will fancy he has 
granted it and so will the audience, as they will recollect 
the induction and assume the particulars were not asked 
25. 
without a purpose." 
XII 
Stratagem number twelve suggests the use of suggestive 
metaphor favorable to one's position, or the use of question-
begging epithets. 
"If the conversation turns upon some 
general conception which has no particular 
name, but requires some figurative or meta-
phorical designation, you must begin by 
choosing a metahpor that is favorable to 
your proposition. For instance, the names 
used to denote the'two political parties, 
in Spain, Serviles and Leberals are obvious-
ly chosen by the latter. The name Protest-
ants is chosen by themselves, and also the 
name Evangelicals; but the Catholics call 
them heretics. Similarly, in regard to 
the names of things which admit of a 
more exact and definite meaning: for ex-
ample, if your opponent proposes an altera-
tion, you can call it an innovation, as 
this is an invidious word,"etc. 26. 
The writer has been unsuccessful in finding this strata-
gem stated explicitly in Aristotle. It is, of course, a very 
evident trick that is used almost instinctively. Aristotle's 
treatment of Figura Dictionis makes it plain that "we must 
solve fallacies from similarity of expression by pointing out 
vu 
the diffe~e~ce_of category denoted by similar words." This 
is not a suggestio~ of the use of the question-begginp, epithet, 
but all fallacies based on figures have at the bottom a 
subtle petitio principii. 
XIII 
Number thirteen aonsists of :forcing the opponent to 
choose between two propositions which are glaringly contrasted 
"To make your opponent accept a proposi-
tion, you must give him the counter-proposition 
as well, leaving him his choice of the two; 
and you must render the contrast as glaring as 
you can, so ~hat to avoid being paradoxical he 
will accept the proposition, which is thus made 
to look QUite probable. For instance, if you 
want to make him admit that a body must do 
everything that his father tells him to do, 
~sk him "whether in all things we must obey 
or disobey our parents". Or, if a thing is 
said to occur "often, 11 ask whether by "often" 
you are to understand few or many cases; and 
he will say "manyn. It is as though you were 
to put grey next black, and call it white; 
or next white, and call it black." 27. 
This is expressly found in Aristotle. 
"To obtain a proposition you should con-
trast it with the opposite. If for instance, 
you want to obtain the premise, that a man 
should obey his father in all things, you 
should ask, Should a man obey or disobey his 
parents in all things; and if you want the 
premise that a. small number multiplied by 
a small number is a large number, you should 
ask whether it is a small number or a large 
number; for if compelledto elect, one would 
rather pronounce it a large number. For the 
juxtaposition of oontraries increases their 
apparent quantity and value.n 28. 
XIV 
This sophism is the advancing in a tone of' tri~ph the 
conclusion as though it had been proved. 
.. "This, which is an impudent trick, is 
played as follows: when your opponent has 
answered several of your questions without 
the answers turning out favorable to the con-
elusion at which you are aiming, advance the 
dasired conclusion, - although it does not 
in the least follow, - as though it had been 
proved, and proclaim it in a tone of triumph. 
If your opponent is shy or stupid, and your 
yourself possess a great deRl of impudence 
and a good voice, the trick may easily 
succeed. It is akin to the fallacy non 
causae ut causae." 29. 
This trick is al3o to be fow1d in Aristotle. It is 
Stated by him in the following language: "An appearance of 
confutation is often produced by a sophistic fraud, when the 
questioner without having proved anything, instead of asking 
~he final proposition, asserts it in the form of a conclu-
sion, as if he had disproved the thesis." 30. 
In number fifteen Schopenhauer suggests the impudent 
trick of submitting a proposition so as to cause the opponent 
to suspect a trick, and then trying to reduce him to absurdity. 
"If you have advanced a paradoxical 
proposition and find a difficulty in proving 
it, you mAy submit for your opponent's accept-
ance or rejection some true proposition, the 
truth of which, however, is not quite pal-
pable, as though you wished to draw your 
proof from it. Should he reject it bec~use 
he suspects a trick, you can obtain your 
triumph by showing hovJ absurd he is; should 
he accept it, you have got reason on your 
side for the moment, and must now look about 
you; or el~e you can employ the previous trick 
as well, and maintain that your paradox is 
proved by the proposition which he has 
accepted. For this an extreme degree of 
. impudence is re ~ uired; but ex per ienoe shows 
oases of it, and there are people who 
practice it by instinct." 31. 
Aristotle seems to have the same stratagem in mind 
when he writes as follows: 
"It is so9histic, too, when the thesis 
is a paradox to ask in proposing the prem-
isses for the respondent's genuine opinion, 
as if the thesis was his genuine opinion, 
and to put all the questions in this shape: 
it is your real opinion, etc., if the 
question is a premiss of the proof, the 
answerer must either be confuted or led 
into paradox; if he grants the premiss, 
he must be confuted; if he says it is not 
his real opinion, he utters a paradox, if 
he refuses to granted the premiss, though 
he allows it to be his opinion, it looks 
as if he were confuted." 32. 
XVI 
Here Sohopenhauer suggests the use of arguments ad 
hominem or ex concessis~ 
"Another trick is to use arguments 
ad hominem or ex concessis. When your 
opponent makes a proposition, you must 
try to see whether it is not in some way 
--if needs be, only a~parently--inconsist­
ent with some other proposition which he 
has made or admitted, or with the prin-
ciples of a school or sect which he has 
commended and approved, or with the 
actions of those who support the seot, 
or else of those who give it only an 
apparent and spurious support, or his 
own actions or want of act ion. For e·x-
ample, should he defend suicide, you may 
at once exclaim, "Why don't you hang,your-
self?" Should he maintain that Berlin is 
an unpleasant place to live in, you may 
say, "Why don't you leave by the first 
train?" Some such claptrap is always 
possible." 33~ 
=-
_Ari~totle also suggests the use of this_ type of strata-
gem. nniscre_pancies should be developed between the thesis 
and the tenets either of the answerer or of those whome he 
acknowledges to be high authorities, or of those who are 
generally so acknowledged, or of those of his own school, 
or of those of the majority of people, or of those of all 
34. 
mankind.rr 
XVII 
This trick consists in saving the day by advancing 
some subtle distinction. 
"If your opponent presses you with a 
counter-proof you will often be able to save 
yourself by advancing some subtle distinc-
tion, which, it is true, had not previous-
ly occurred to you; that is, if the matter 
admits of a double application, or of being 
taken in any ambiguous sense." 35. 
Aristotle states the same thing by saying, "And as the 
answerer avoids immediate confutation by drawing distinctions, 
so the questioner who forsees an obJection that applies in 
one sense and not in another, should explain that he means 
36. 
the proposition in the unobjectionable sense." 
XVIII 
Here Schopenhauer indicates how to save oneself from 
defeat by digressing from the point at issue. 
"If you observe that your opponent has taken 
up a line of argument which will end in your 
defeat, you must not allow him to carry it to 
its conclusion, but interrupt the course of 
the dispute in time, or break it off alto-
. get her, .or lead him away from the subject, 
. and bring him to others. In short, you 
must effect the trick which will be noticed 
lat~r on, the mutatio controversiae." 37. 
This tridk is suggested by Schopenhauer in several of 
his stratagems: number twenty-nine, nineteen, twenty-six, and 
thirty-four. 
Aristotle makes the same observation. In speaking of 
those who are in the process of being confuted, he suggests, 
\ 
"They should also break off their argument and cut down their 
other lines of attack •••• one should also lead attacks some-
38. 
times against positions other than the ones stated." 
XIX 
This is another type of stratagem based on changing the 
:s.ubjeet. 
"Should your opponent expressly challenge 
you to produce any objection to some definite 
point in his argument, and you have nothing 
much to say, you must try to give the matter 
a general turn, and then talk against~ that. 
If you are called upon to say why a particu-
lar physical pypothesis cannot be accepted, 
you may speak of the fallibility of human 
knowledge, and give v~rious illustrations 
of it." 39. 
I have been unable to find this stratagem explicitly 
stated in Aristotle. There is a similarity in one element, 
that is, giving the matter a general turn. He warns that any 
ndigressing from the argument in hand" should be anticipated 
and one must "restrict the bearing" to the subject under 
40. 
discussion. 
.XX 
This trick is an application of the fallacy non causae 
ut causae. 
"When you have elicited all yo11r premisses, 
and your opponent has admitted them, you must 
refrain from asking him for the conclusion, but 
draw it at once for yourself; nay, even though 
one or other of the premisses should be lacking, 
you may take it as though it too had been ad-
mitted, and draw the conclusion. This trick 
is an ap~lication of the fallacy non causae 
ut causae." 41. 
Aristotle tells us that an appearance of confutation is 
often produced by a sophistic fraud "when the Questioner 
without having proved anytmmng, instead of asking the final 
proposition, asserts it in the form of a conclusion as if he 
42. 
had disproved the thesis." 
44 • 
In discussing the fallacy non causa pro causa, he suggest 
the foll,qwing as a solution: 
"In fallacies where a superfluous proposition 
is foisted in as the cause of an absurd conclu-
sion, we must examine whether the suppression 
of the premiss would interrupt the conclusion; 
and after showing that it does hot, we may add 
that the premisses which really cause it were 
not granted because they were believed, but 
because the r1uestioner seemed to wish to use 
them against the thesis, which he has failed 
to do." 43. 
XXI 
Here Schopenhauer suggests the meeting of superficial 
Arguments by counter arguments e~ually superficial. 
11 When your opponent uses a merely superficial 
or sophistical argument and you see through it, 
you can, it is true, refute it by setting forth 
its ca ious and s 
is better to meet him with a counter-argu-
ment whi~h is just as superficial and s6ph-
istioal, and so dispose of' him; for it is 
with vi~tory you are concerned, and not 
with truth~" 44. 
The writer has been unable to find any parallel 
to this st:ratagem in the writings of .Aristotle. In f'act, it 
arrears to me that Sohopenhauer's suggestion isn't wise 
strategy. In my opinion it would be much better to note the 
oa:Dtious and superficial natt1re of the opponent's argument 
rather than to lower one's intellectual dignity by resorting 
to the same superficial reasoning. 
XX.! I 
In number twenty-two it is pointed out that one can 
avoid admitting something prejudicial to his interest by 
declaring it a petitio princip~i. 
"If your opponent requires you to admit 
something from which the point in dispute 
will immediately follow, you must refuse to 
do so, declaring that it is a petitio prin-
cipii. For he and the audience will regard 
a proposition which is near akin to the 
point in dispute as identical with it, and 
in this way you deprive him of his best 
argument." 45. 
Aristotle suggests this in a rather indirect way. He 
speaks of Deople who think that they must at all costs 
overthrow the premisses that lie near the conclusion. He 
remarks that these people plead "in excuse for refusing to 
grant him some of them (premisses) that he is begging the 
original question.n He adds, nso whenever any one claims to 
from ,lls a. point Slloh as is bot1nd to follo·w as a oonseqllenoe 
46. 
from our thesis •••• we mllst plead the same." 
XXIII 
Here Schopenhaller makes llse of the trick of empl0ying 
contradiction and contention to irritate a man to exaggeratio 
then to refllte his exaggerated statement. 
"Contradiction and contention irritate a 
man into exaggerating his statement. By 
contradicting yollr opponent yoll may drive 
him into extending beyond its proper limits 
a statement which, at all events within those 
limits and in itself, is trlle; and when yoll 
refute this exa~gerated form of it, you look 
as though you had also refuted his original 
statement. Contrarily, you must take care 
not to allow yourself to be misled by con-
tradiction into exaggerating or extending a 
statement of your own. It will often happen 
that your opponent will himself directly try 
to extend your statement further than you 
mean it; here you must at once stop him, and 
bring him back to the limits whiah you set 
up: "That's what I said, and no more." 47. 
This stratagem like number eight and number twenty-
seven make use of the weakness a man throw himself open 
to under strong emotion. Aristotle speaks of angering your 
opponent in the heat of dispute. He notes that "any mental 
48. 
discomfiture pllts us off our guard." Aristotle in this 
connection, however, does not ex~ressly suggest this as a 
means of making one exaggerate his ·statements and then taking 
advantage of this exaggeration. 
XXIV 
This trick is similar to number one. It consists in 
distorting a proposition and then attempting to re!ate the 
distortion. 
•This trick consists in stating a false 
syllogism. Your opponent makes a proposition, and 
by false inference and distortion of his ideas 
you force from it other propositions which it 
does not contain and he does not in the least mean; 
nay, which are absurd or dangerous. It then looks 
as if his proposition gave rise to others which are 
inconsistent either with thenselves or with some 
acknowledged truth, and so it appears to be in-
directly refuted. This is the diversion, and it 
is another application of the fallacy non causae 
u.t cau.sae." 49 
Aristotle suggests this stratagen when he remarks 
that "sometimes the questioner must attack a proposition 
different from the thesis." 50. He also speaks of a 
"superflaou.s proposition foisted in as the cause of 
51. 
an absurd conclusion." 
nv 
In number twenty-five Sahopenhauer suggests that 
when one's opponent contradiets a u.niversal statement 
by an instanae to the contra~y one must observe whether 
the example is really true and true in the sense stated 
and also whether it is inconsistent with this conception. 
"This is a ease of the diversion by 
means of an ipstance to the aontrary. With 
an induation(ert:L-y-w r"' ~ ' a great number of 
partiau.lar instances are required in order 
to establish it as a uniyersal pr9position; 
but with the diversion (#rr~r~r~ ) a sin-
gle instance, to which the proposition does 
not apply, is all that is neaessary to over-
throw it. This is a controversiaL method 
known as the instance - instantia, (~vrrA~(~ Q 
' 1 
For example. "all ruminants are horned" is a 
propos111Dn which may be upset by the single 
instance of the camel. The instance is a case 
in which a aniversal truth is sought to be app-
lied, and something is inserted in the funda-
mental definition of it which is not univer-
sally true, and by which it is upset. But 
there is room for mistake; and when this 
trick is employed by your opponent, you must 
observe (1) whether the example which he gives 
is really true; for there are problems of which 
the only true solution is that the case in 
point is not true - for example, many miracles, 
ghost stories, and so on; and (2) whether it 
really comes under the conception of the truth 
thus stated; for it may only appear to doso 
and the matter is one to be settled by 
precise distinctions; and (3) whether it 
is really inconsistent with this conception; 
for this again may ·be only an ap_parent in-
consistency." 52. · 
This seems not to be precisely found in Aristotle. 
Of course he speaks of universals as capable of being refuted 
by an instance to the contrary. He observes that "the 
universal affirmative is most difficult to establiEh, most 
53. 
easy to overthrow." But he evidently does not give the 
rules to be observed when employing this trick, as does 
Schopenhauer. 
XXVI 
This stratagem consists in turning the tables and using 
the opponent's arrgument ar;ainst himself. 
"i\ brilliant move is the retorsio argumenti, 
or turning of the tables, by which your 
opponent 1 2 argument is turned against himself. 
Ee declares, for instance, "So-and-so is a 
child, you must make allowance for him." 
You retort, "Just because he is a child, 
I must correct him otherwise he will per-
sist in his bad habits." 54. 
~---------------------------' 
The statement of this trick is evidently not to be found 
in Aristotle. 
XXVII 
Here Schopenhau~r suggests urging the point at which 
one's opponent becomes angry. 
nshould your opponent surprize you by 
becoming particularly angry at an argument, 
you must urge it with all the more zeal; not 
only because it is a good thing to make him 
angry, but because it may be presumed that you 
have here put your finger on the weak side of 
his ease, and that just here he is more open to 
attack than even for the moment you peraei.ve." 55. 
Scho_penhauer has several stratagems that make us of one's. 
weakness in times of anger: numbers eight, twenty .. three, 
and so forth. As we have observed, Aristotle suggested the 
use of angering one since the "heat of dispute" brings mental 
discomfiture and "puts us off guard." This seems to be the 
nearest approach Aristotle has of this particular stratagem. 
Apparently he no where suggests urging the point as a sign 
of weakness. 
XXVIII 
This consists in the use of the argument ad auditores. 
It takes advantage of the fact that an explanation would 
re~uire too m~ah time. 
"This is chiefly practicable in a dispute 
between scholars in the presence of the unlearned. 
If you have no argument ad rem, and none either 
ad hominem, you can make on ad auditores; that 
is to say, ·you can start some invalid objection, 
which, however, only an expert sees to be invalid. 
Now your opponent is an expert, but those who form 
audeience are not, and accordingly in their 
eyes he is defeated; particularly if the 
audience senses that the objection which you 
make places him in any ridiculous light. 
People are ready to laugh, and you have the 
laughers on your side. To show that your 
objection is an idle one, would require a 
long explanation on the part of your 
opponent, and a reference to the principles 
of the branch of knowledge in question, or 
to the elements of the matter which you are 
discussing; and people are not disposed to 
listen to it." 56. 
Aristotle seems to have this trick in mind when he 
writes as follows: "Just as it is possible to bring a 
solution sometirr1es against the argument, at others against 
the questioner and his mode of :uestioning, and at others 
against neither of these, likewise als0 it is possible to 
vUe 
marshal one's questions and reasoning both against the thesis, 
and against the answerer and against the time, whenever the 
solution requires a longer time to examine than the period 
57. 
available." 
XXIX: 
Here it is suggested that one can save himself by 
changing the subjec~ 
"If you find that you are being worsted, 
you can make a diversion, that is, you can 
suddenly begin to talk of something else, as 
though it had a bearing on the matter in 
dispute, Elnd af'forded an argument against 
your opponent. This may be done without 
presum~tion if the diversion has, in fact, 
some general bearing on the matter; but 
it is a piece of impudence if it has nothing 
to do with the case, and is only brought in 
by way of attacking your opponent. 
"The diversion is mere impudence if it 
completely abandons the point in dis ute d 
raises for instance, some such objection, as 
· "Yes, . and. you alsr:, said just now," and so on. 
For then the argument becomes to some extent 
personal. Strictly speaking, it is halfway 
between the argument~~ ad ~ersonam, and the 
argumentum ad hominem." 58. 
The exact nature of this stratagem is apparently not 
to be found in Aristotle, although he does suggest that one 
can avoid confutation by breaking off their argument and 
clltting down the line of attack of the enemy. .And again, 
he tells us that "whenever one f'orsees any g_U.estion coming, 
one should put in one's objection and have one say before-
hand: for by doing so one is likely to embarrass the 
59. 
Questioner most effectively." 
Appealing to authority rather than reason is the 
substance of this stratagem. 
"This is the argumentum ad vereaundiam. 
It consists in making an appeal to authority 
rather than reason, and in using such an 
authority as may suit the degree of knowledge 
possessed by your opponent. 
"Every man prefers belief to the exercise 
of judgment, says Seneca; and it is therefore 
an easy matter if you have an authority on 
your side which your opponent respects. The 
more limited his capacity and knowledge, the 
greater is the number of the authorities 
who weigh with him." 60. 
Schopenhauer occupies five pages expatiatinp, on this 
stratagem. He notes that ordinary folks have a deep respect 
for professional men. He suggests also that since many 
authorities find respect with the mob, one may quote what 
these. au~horities said in ~~nether sense or in other circum-
stances. In speaking of the appeal to a universal prejudioe, 
Schopenhauer remarks that, "there is no opinion, however 
absurd, which men will not readily embrace. as soon as they 
can be brought to the conviction that it is generally adopted 
He then illustrates the fact that universality of an opinion 
is not proof. 
The part of this stratagem of Schopenhauer that suggest 
falsifying authority is evidently not in Aristotle. He does, 
however, suggest that "discrepancies should be developed 
between the thesis and the tenets either of the answerer or 
of those whom he acknowledges to be high authorities, or of 
those who are generally so acknowledge, or of those of his ow 
school, or of those of the majority of p~ople, or of those 
61. 
of all mankind. 11 
XXXI 
This suggested stratagem consists in saving one's self 
from defeat by declaring oneself to be in incompetent judge. 
"If you know that you have no reply to 
tp the arguments which your opponent advances, 
you may, by a fine stroke of irony, declare 
yourself to be an incompetent judge: "Vfuat 
you now say passes my poor powers of compre-
hension; it may be all very true, but I 
can't understand it, and I refrain from any 
expression of opinion on it." In this way 
you insinuate to the bystanders, with whom 
you are in good repute, that what your 
opponent says is nonseaae. Thus, when 
Kant's Kritik appeared, or, rather, when it began 
to make a noise in the new world, many pro-
fessors of the old eclectic school declared 
that they failed to understand it, in the 
belief that their fanlure settled the business. 
But· Vlhen the adherents of the new school proved 
.to them that they were quite right, and had 
really failed to understand it, they were in 
a very bad humour. 
"This is a trick which may be used only 
when you are quite sure that the audience thinks 
much be.tter of you than of your opponent. A 
professor, for instance, may try it on a 
student •••• It is a particularly malicious 
assertion of one~s own authority, instead 
of giving reasons." 62. 
53. 
As far as the writer has been able to discover, Aristo-
totle doesn't have any suggestion of this type of trick. 
XXXII 
This is a commonly used trick of throwing suspicion 
upon an assertion by classing it with something to which a 
stigma is attached. 
"If you are confronted with an assertion, 
there is a short way of getting rid of it, or, 
at any rate, of throwing suspicion on it, by 
putting it into some odious category; even 
though the connection is only apparent, or 
else of a loose character. You can say for 
instance, "That is Manichaeism," or "It is 
Arianis:1," or "Pelagianism," or "Idealism," 
or "Spinozism," or "Pantheism," or "Brownianism," 
or "Naturalism, n or "A the ism," or "Rationalism," 
"Spritualism," "Mysticism," and so on. In 
making an objection of this kind, you take 
it for granted (1) that the assertion in 
question is identical with, or is at least 
contained in, the category cited - that is 
to say, you cry out, "Oh, I have heard that 
before"; and (2) that the system referred 
to has been entirely refuted, and does 
not contain a word of truth." 63. 
This particular stratagem is not suggested by Aristotle 
as far as I was able to discover. He does, however, speak 
of solving.thl9 fallacy from "similarity of expression by 
nointing out the difference of category denoted by similar 
"' 64. 
·words." 
XXXIII 
This is a sophism that affirms that something may be all 
right in theory but not in practice. 
"That's all very well in theory, but it won't 
do in practice." In this sophism you admit the 
premisses but deny the conclusion, in contradic-
tion with a well-known rule of logic. The asser-
tion is based upon an impossibility: what is right 
in theory must work in practice; and if it does 
not, there-rs-a mistake in theory; something has 
been overlooked and not allowed for; and, con-
sequently, what is wrong in practice is wrong 
in theory too." 65. 
The explicit suggestion of this sophism is apparently 
not found in Aristotle. He, does, of course, suggest the 
rule of logic of which this is a contradiction, namely, 
"From true premisses it is not possible to draw a false 
conclusion, but a true conclusion may be drawn from false 
~remisses, true however, only in respect to fact, not to 
66. 
reason." 
XXXIV 
In number thirty-four Schopenhauer suggests the strata-
gem of urging the point when the opponent avoids the answer 
and turns the subject. 
"When you state a question or an argument, 
and your opponent gives you no direct answer or 
reply, ant evades it by a counter-question or 
an indirect answer, or some assertion which 
has no bearing on the matter, and generally 
tries to turn the subtject, it is a sure sign that 
yo'u have touched a we a~ SIJOt, sometimes without 
knowing it. You have, as it were, reduced him 
to silence. You must, therefore, furge the 
point all the more, and not let your opponent 
evade it, even when you do not know where the 
weakness which you have hit tlpon really lies." 67. 
This is a very self-evident puggestion, but apparently 
it was not within the scope of Aristotle's treatise to 
suggest it. 
mv 
This SLlggestion consists in working upon the will 
rather than the intellect of one's opponent, or the argument-
urn ab utilit. 
"There is another trick w•ich, as soon 
as it is practicable, makes all others un-
necessary. Instead of working on your 
opponent's intellect by argument, work 
on his will by motive; and he, and also 
the audience if they have similar interests, 
will at once be won over to your opinion, 
even though you got it out of a lunatic 
asylum; for, as a general .rule, half an 
ounce of will is more effective than a 
hundred-weight of insight and intelligence. 
This, it is true, oan be done only under 
peculiar circumstances. If you succeed 
in making your opponent feel that his 
opinion, should it prove true, will be 
distinctly prejudicial to his interest, 
he will let it drop like a hot 9otato, 
and feel that it was very imprudentuto 
take it up. 
"A clergyman, for instance, is defend-
ing some philosophical do?~a; you make him 
sensible of the fact that it is in immediate 
lontradiotion with one of the fundamental 
doctrines of his Church, and he abandons 
it ••• ··" 68 •. 
Sohopenhauer devotes q1~i te a bit of space to illustrate 
•.r:z:. 
,. 
this trick. Here again the exploit statement of this trick 
is not set forth by Aristotle. There is some similarity, 
however, between this and one of the methods Aristotle 
sQ~gests as a means of reducing the opponent to paradox. 
"Paradox may be elicited by considering ~o what school the 
respondent bel0ngs, and ~roposing some tenets of the school 
69. 
that the world pronounces to be a paradox." 
XXXVI 
Here Schopenhauer suggests the use of bombast as a 
means of bewildering one's opponent. 
"You may also puzzle and bewilder your 
opponent by mere bombast; and the trick is 
possible, because a man generally supposes 
that there must be some meaning in words •• 
•• If he is secretly conscious of his own 
weakness, and accustomed to heart much that 
he ~oes not understand, and to make as though 
he did, you can easily impose upon him by some 
seiious fooling that sounds very deep and 
learned, and deprives him of hearing, sight, 
and though:b; and by giving out that it is 
the most indisputable proof of what you 
assert. It is a well-known fact that in 
recent times some philosoph&~slhave prac-
ticed this trick on the Whole of the public 
with the most brilliant success. But since 
present examples are odious, we may refer 
to The Vicar of Wakefield for an old one." 70. 
Neither was the writer able to find this in the writings 
of Aristotle. 
XXXVII 
This trick consists in disproving a faulty proof and 
then claiming to have refuted the whole position. 
"Should your opponent be in the right, but, 
luckily for your contention, choose a 
faulty proof, you can easily manage to 
refute it, and then claim that you have 
thus refuted his whole position. This is 
a trick which ought to be one of the first; 
it is, at bottom, an expedient by which an 
argumentum ad hominem is _put forward as an 
argumentum ad rem. If' no accurate proof 
occurs to hiL or to the bystanders, you 
have won the day. For example, if a 
man advances the ontological argument 
by way of proving God's existence, you 
oan get the best of him, for the onto-
logical argument may easily be refuted. 
This is the way in which bad advocates 
lose a good case, by trying to justify 
it by an authority which does not fit 
it, when no fitting one occurs to 
them." 71. 
Although this is a common stratagem, Aristotle does 
not seem to have such a suggestion. 
XXVIII 
The last stratagem that Schopenhauer suggests is 
to defend one's self by attacking the disputant himself. 
"A lasttrick is to become personal, 
insulting, rude, as soon as you perceive 
th?t your opponent has the upper hand, and 
that you are going to come off worst. 
It consists in passing from the subject 
·of dispute, as from a lost game, to the 
disputant himself, and in some way attack-
ing his person. It may be called the 
argumentum ad personam, to distinguish 
it from the argumentum ad hominem, 
which passes from the objective discuss-
iop of the subject pure and simple to 
the statements or admissions which your 
opponent has made in regard to it. But 
in hecoming personal you leave the 
subject altogether, and turn your attack 
to his person, by remarks of an offensive 
and spiteful nature. It is an appeal from 
the virtues of the intellect to the virtues 
of the body, or to mere animalism. This is 
a very p~p~la~ _trick, because every one is 
able to aarry it into effect; and so it is 
of frequent application ••••• " 72. 
Schopenhauer expatiates at some length upon this 
trick and brings to a close his Art of Controversy by 
suggesting some of the advantages of con~roversy and some 
rules to observe in disputation. 
Aristotle apparently makes no suggestion as to the 
use of the trick argumentum ad personam. 
vo. 
CONCLUSION 
As we bring this thesis to a close we ·will summarize 
and analyze our findings. In our chapter on their definition 
of Dialectic we observed that Aristotle uses the word in a 
broader sense than did Schopenhauer who defined it as the 
art of gaining one's point. 
In the chapter on the basis of all Dialectic we noted 
that .Aristotle did not explicitly have a framework to which 
every dispute could be reduced; but that there was to be 
found in his writings the two basic principles that Schopen-
hauer set forth, namely, that the two modes of refutation 
are to show that a proposition is not in accord with 
absolute objective reality or that it is not consistent with 
other statements or admissions of one's opponent. 
'ffe observed also that the objects of Schopenhauer and 
.Aristotle were radically different, .Aristotle being the much 
broader and his treatment of the fallacies more general 
than Schopenhauer who merely gives a collection of dishonest 
stratagems by which one may be enabled to defend one's self 
and frustrate others. 
A study of their comparative treatment of the strata-
gems reveals that a large proportion of Schopenhauer's 
suggested stratagems are either implicitly or explicitly 
found in Aristotle. It is not an easy matter to determine 
which stratagems may be classified as explicitly or implicit 
ly in Aristotle, bQt according to my interpretation I have 
found that seventeen out of the thirty-eight stratagems of 
Schopenhauer may be stated as being explicitly found in the 
1. 
writings of Aristotle and six may be considered implicit. 
It is noteworthy that thirteen of the seventeen strata-
gems are t~eated by Aristotle in the fifteen chapter of 
De Sonhisticis Elenohis. As we have observed, this work is 
a treatise on the fallacies and not merely an endeavor to 
enumerate dialectical stratagems. The fifteenth chapter, 
however, is given to the discussion of rrthe sources from 
which fallacies come," or as Aristotle says, "fbrms of dis-
honesty in puttine, questions." It is natural thus ti expect 
that many of the similarities will be found in this c&hapterr.:.l, · 
We actually find that vJith the exception of one insertion, 
Schopenhauer's stratagems follow the identiaal sequenae of 
2. 
this chapter and in these thirteen stratagems often the 
language is remarkably similar to that of Aristotle. 
Sahopenhauerts treatment of these is merely a reproduc-
tion and amplification of Aristotle. ae must, however, in 
justice to Schopenhauer, point out that he has a footnote 
appended to his statement, "This erotematic or Socratic, 
method was especially in use among the ancients; and this and 
3. 
some of the tricks following later are akin to it," which 
reads, "They are all free versions of Chapter 15 of Aristotle's 
De Sop.hist ic is Elenchis. rr 
From this, however, one would not suspect that more than 
one-third of Scl10penhaue.r.' s suggested stratagems sould be mere 
en enlargement of those found in Aristotle and that they would 
follow almost the identical order. Oaa wonders how Schopen-
hauer could honestly state in the beginning of his work, "I am 
not aware that anything has been done in this direction, al-
though I have made inquiries far and wide. It is therefore an 
4. 
uncultivated soil." He refers here, of course, to a 
collection of dialectical stratagems. He even goes so far as 
to state in the same connection, "What follovJs is to be regard-
5. 
ed as a first attempt." In the light of the faat that out 
of his thirty-eight stratagems, seventeen may be found expliai 
ly and six implicitly in Aristotle, it seems strange that 
Scho9enhauer should make the above claims. In other words, 
of the thirty-eight stratagems, only fifteen are not traceable 
to Aristotle. Even in many of these there are points of 
similarity. 
The writer does not want to ~ake it appear that 
Aristotle was the exclusive source of Schopenhauer's The Art 
~f--~r~~~' but it would seem evident that he made greater 
use of Aristotle than would appear through the few incidental 
references that he makes to him. 
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